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The Death Penalty’s Dark Side: A 
Response to Phyllis Goldfarb’s Matters 
of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class  
Structures in Capital Cases 
Kevin Barry* & Bharat Malkani** 
Abstract 
In Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Structures in 
Capital Cases, Professor Phyllis Goldfarb examines the ways in 
which race, class, and gender affect the American criminal justice 
system generally, and its death penalty system in particular. This 
Response focuses on one of Goldfarb’s observations: The 
relationship between slavery and the death penalty. This 
relationship helps to explain why, over the past four decades, the 
thirteen states that comprised the former Confederacy have been 
responsible for nearly all of this nation’s executions. Although the 
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly failed to address the death 
penalty’s roots in slavery, several state court judges have risen to 
the occasion, calling out the impermissible taint of bias that colors 
the death penalty. This Response suggests how the death penalty’s 
connection to slavery should inform death penalty jurisprudence 
and concludes with a discussion of the future of abolition, given a 
Supreme Court in flux. 
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I. Introduction 
On February 27, 2017, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson 
announced that he would execute one-fifth of those on the state’s 
death row because the drugs needed to kill them were set to 
expire at the end of April.1 Much was made of how many people 
the governor intended to execute—a record eight inmates in 
eleven days.2 Much was also made of how they would be 
executed—a lethal cocktail of three drugs, one of which has been 
known to fail and apparently did fail in at least one of the 
executions.3 But little attention has been paid to who was 
executed. Although four white men and four black men were 
slated for death, three of the four white men were spared.4 
Nothing says black lives don’t matter quite like the death 
penalty.5 
                                                                                                     
 1. Andrew DeMillo, Arkansas Governor Sets Execution Dates for 8 
Inmates, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/arkansas/articles/2017-02-27/arkansas-governor-
sets-execution-dates-for-8-inmates (last visited May 25, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. Camila Domonoske, Arkansas Readies For 8 Executions, Despite Outcry 
Over Pace, Method, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (March 31, 2017), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/31/521967661/arkansas-
readies-for-8-executions-despite-outcry-over-pace-method (last visited May 25. 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3.  Id.; Phil McCausland, Arkansas Execution of Kenneth Williams 
‘Horrifying’: Lawyer, NBC NEWS (April 27, 2017), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/lethal-injection/arkansas-executes-kenneth-
williams-4th-lethal-injection-week-n752086 (last visited May 25. 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. Mark Berman, Fourth Arkansas Execution in Eight Days Prompts 
Questions About Inmate’s Movements, WASH. POST (April 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/04/27/arkansas-
readies-to-carry-out-last-planned-execution-before-drugs-
expire/?utm_term=.7f01badaf3e4 (last visited May 25. 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class 
Structures in Capital Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1405 (2016) 
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The invisibility of race in death penalty jurisprudence is well 
documented.6 Some commentators have rightly referred to racism 
as the death penalty’s “dark side”: ever-present but often difficult 
to discern.7 In her characteristically thoughtful essay, Matters of 
Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Structures in Capital Cases, 
Professor Phyllis Goldfarb shines the light on the death penalty’s 
dark side.8 Using the case of a former Virginia death row inmate, 
Joseph Giarratano, as her lens, she examines the multitude of 
ways in which race, class, and gender affect the American 
criminal justice system generally, and its death penalty system in 
particular.9 
In this Response, we focus on one of Goldfarb’s observations: 
The relationship between slavery—the pinnacle of American 
racism—and the death penalty.10 In Part II, we briefly explore 
the history of the two institutions.11 The death penalty’s 
connection to slavery is not a distant parallel; it is a straight line. 
Over the past four decades, the thirteen states of the former 
Confederacy have been responsible for nearly all of this nation’s 
executions.12 This relationship is not a coincidence. 
We next turn to judicial responses to slavery and the death 
penalty. In Part III, we discuss how a majority of the United 
States Supreme Court has been unwilling to draw a link between 
                                                                                                     
(“[Q]uestions about whether and how black lives matter are still haunting us, as 
they have for centuries.”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Courting Death:  The 
Supreme Court and Capital Punishment 78–115 (2016). 
 7. See id. at 321 (discussing “the darker sides of the American death 
penalty—particularly the extent to which the resonance of the practice and its 
continued use have been inseparably connected to race”). 
 8. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1395–99. 
 9. See generally id. 
 10. See id, at 1401–05.  We are in good company discussing this connection 
in relation to Goldfarb’s work.  For a thoughtful and thorough response to 
Goldfarb’s essay that discusses the death penalty’s roots in slavery, see generally 
John D. Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty:  A Crossroads for 
Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 487 (2017). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 52 (Conn. 2015) (noting that “[t]he 
thirteen states that comprised the Confederacy have carried out more than 75 
percent of the nation’s executions over the past four decades”). 
THE DEATH PENALTY’S DARK SIDE 187 
slavery and the death penalty.13 From Furman and McCleskey to 
Buck and Foster, the Court has responded with silence when 
confronted with the death penalty’s roots in slavery. 
In Part IV, we discuss several state court justices that have 
risen to the occasion, finding an unacceptable taint of racial bias 
in the administration of the death penalty dating back to 
slavery.14 We discuss their findings and suggest two doctrinal 
pathways for future courts to follow. Specifically, we argue that 
the death penalty’s roots in slavery should inform courts’ 
determination of the national consensus that the death penalty 
purportedly enjoys and the legitimate purposes that it 
purportedly achieves. 
In Part V, we discuss the future of abolition, given a 
Supreme Court in flux.15 We conclude with some general 
remarks. 
II. A Straight Line 
The death penalty’s connection to slavery is not the stuff of 
hyperbole or analogy. The histories of both institutions are tightly 
bound. As Goldfarb explains, “the ghosts of the colonial and 
antebellum slave system” continue to haunt our death penalty.16 
Indeed, “[o]ne cannot understand America’s penologies of capital 
punishment—its legitimation of state-imposed death—without 
understanding its ideologies of race” that began with slavery.17  
From the earliest colonial days, slavery and the death 
penalty were symbiotic.18 In the southern states, one of the 
principal purposes behind the death penalty was to protect the 
white minority from violence and rebellion by an enslaved black 
                                                                                                     
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. See Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1404–05. 
 17. Id. at 1400–02. 
 18. See STEIKER, supra note 6, at 17 (“The distinctive Southern embrace of 
capital punishment is in large part a product of the South’s historical practice of 
chattel slavery and of slavery’s enduring racial legacy long after the end of the 
Civil War.”); see also STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 142 (2002) (“The South’s retention of capital punishment for blacks was 
surely a direct result of slavery.”). 
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majority.19 Capital punishment was therefore a vital component 
in the machinery of slavery: the perpetual threat of death served 
to keep slave populations under control.20 Fear of captivity in 
prison, the reasoning went, would mean little to those already 
enslaved; indeed, “imprisonment would have been a reward, 
giving the slave time to rest.”21 Without the threat of death, 
slavery may have been lost to rebellion.22 And without slavery, 
the death penalty may have lost its appeal as a deterrent.23 
Slavery demanded the death penalty, and the death penalty, in 
turn, demanded slavery. The connection between the institutions 
is not a distant parallel but rather a straight line. 
Slavery and the death penalty not only reinforced each other 
but also closely resembled each other—both were explicitly race 
conscious in their application.24 Although the death penalty, 
unlike slavery, applied to both blacks and whites, state “slave 
codes” ensured that blacks were subject to capital punishment for 
a wider range of crimes than whites.25 Such laws even 
compensated white slaveholders for the “taking” of executed 
slaves.26 In colonial Georgia, for example, the criminal code 
                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at 7, 19. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Brief of Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People et al., Aikens v. California, 1971 WL 134376, at *9 (U.S. Aug. 31, 
1971) [hereinafter NAACP Amic. Br.]; see also BANNER, supra note 18, at 142. 
 22. Cf. MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE 500 (2016) (discussing slave 
rebellions and revolutionary abolition). 
      23. Diann Rust-Tierney, We, Too, Are Abolitionists: Black History Month, 
Slavery and the Death Penalty, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diann-rusttierney/we-too-are-
abolitionists_b_168386.html (last visited May 25, 2017) (“Had it not been for 
slavery, the death penalty would have likely been abolished in America.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 24. See NAACP Amic. Br., supra note 21, at *8–11 (discussing the pre-1935 
history of formal and informal capital punishment by whites against non-
whites). 
 25. See id. at *9 (“Every southern state defined a substantial number of 
felonies carrying capital punishment for slaves and lesser punishments for 
whites.”).  
 26. See STEIKER, supra note 6, at 19–21 (noting that the owners of executed 
slaves were compensated “in the same way that property owners today are 
compensated when their land is taken by the state for a public use such as a 
highway”); see also Race and Capital Sentencing, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1603, 1619 
n.11 (1988) (discussing slave codes’ racially disparate punishments); Harry V. 
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provided for an automatic death sentence for blacks who 
committed murder, while non-black murderers could receive a life 
sentence.27 
During the 1830s and 1840s, many states limited their lists 
of capital crimes and moved executions out of the public arena 
into more private settings.28 Importantly, these death penalty 
reforms did not extend to slaves and free blacks.29 A study by 
George Stroud in 1856 found that in Virginia, for example, there 
were sixty-six potentially capital crimes that attracted the death 
penalty when committed by slaves, yet just one crime for which 
white defendants could be executed.30 In Mississippi, there were 
thirty-eight crimes that were capital for slaves but not for 
whites.31 And in Georgia, as in many southern states, black men 
were executed for raping white women, while white men were 
imprisoned or fined.32  
Slaves and free blacks also faced gruesome public executions, 
including crucifixion, starvation, and having one’s hands cut off 
prior to being hanged or burned alive.33 White defendants, by 
contrast, were hanged in private.34 The emergence of such 
racially disparate death penalties reinforced the view—held to 
                                                                                                     
Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the 
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 
212 n.50 (1965) (discussing slave codes’ reimbursement of slaveholders). 
 27. See State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 207 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., 
dissenting) (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 329 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting))). 
 28. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 18, at 139–41; STEIKER, supra note 6, at 
20–21; Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in 
Historical Perspective, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 103–06 (Charles J. Ogletree Jr & Austin Sarat 
eds. 2006). 
 29. See, e.g., Loftin, 724 A.2d at 208 (discussing racially disparate manner 
of executions); NAACP Amic. Br., supra note 21, at *9–11 (discussing racially 
disparate punishments). 
 30. GEORGE M STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE 
SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 75–87 (2d ed. 1856). 
 31. Id.  
 32.  Id. 
 33. See Loftin, 724 A.2d at 208 (discussing racial distinctions in 
administration of death penalty); see also NAACP Amic. Br., supra note 21, at 
*9 (discussing crucifixion, burning, and starvation). 
 34. See Loftin, 724 A.2d at 208. 
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this day—that black bodies are worth less than those of whites.35 
Not surprisingly, the opponents of slavery, like Frederick 
Douglass, decried the death penalty as “a mockery of justice.”36 
Although many slavery abolitionists contributed to the cause 
of death penalty abolition by “excoriating ‘hangman clergymen’ 
who supported the death penalty and the inhumane notion of 
retributive justice,”37 the progress of the anti-slavery movement 
brought efforts to eliminate capital punishment to a halt in the 
1850s and 1860s.38 For example, in Connecticut, a grassroots 
campaign to abolish the death penalty in the 1840s and early 
1850s foundered in 1854, as “[p]ublic attention turned away to 
the more pressing issues of Irish immigration and the expansion 
of slavery in the western territories.”39 And Marvin Bovee delayed 
the publication of his anti-death penalty book on the eve of the 
Civil War, noting that it would be inappropriate to defend the 
lives of murderers and rapists when so many soldiers were 
heroically sacrificing their lives on the battlefield.40 As David 
Brion Davis has argued, after the Civil War, Americans were 
                                                                                                     
 35. South Carolina’s 1740 slave code “must be understood not only for what 
it did to blacks and slaves—assuring their submissiveness, guaranteeing their 
ignorance, and sanctioning great brutality,” but also for what it did to whites—
“impos[ing] an obligation on white inhabitants to set aside any natural human 
compassion and grant[ing] extraordinary inducements to those who would revel 
in brutality against blacks.” A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM JR, IN THE MATTER OF 
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 199 
(1978).  
 36. Frederick Douglass, Capital Punishment is a Mockery of Justice, in 3 
John Blassingame, The Frederick Douglass Papers 242–248 (1985); see also 
Paul Christian Jones, Against the Gallows: Antebellum American Writers and 
the Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment (2011). 
 37. Sinha, supra note 22, at 380; see also Banner, supra note 18, at 142–43 
(“In the North the most outspoken supporters of abolishing capital punishment 
were also in favor of abolishing slavery and a host of other reforms.”); Lawrence 
B. Goodheart, The Solemn Sentence of Death:  Capital Punishment in 
Connecticut 107 (2011) (discussing “mainstream ministers [who] denounced the 
radical antislavery movement” and “castigated opponents of the death penalty”). 
 38. Banner, supra note 18, at 134; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 338–39 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the history of 
abolition). 
 39. Goodheart, supra note 37, at 109. 
 40. John D. Bessler, Death in the Dark:  Midnight Executions in America 
45–46 (1997). Bovee eventually published his tract in 1869, see generally Marvin 
Bovee, Christ and the Gallows; or, Reasons for the Abolition of Capital 
Punishment (1869). 
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hardened to the loss of life, thus dissipating any anti-death 
penalty sentiments.41 
As Goldfarb explains, following the end of slavery, the death 
penalty was vital to reasserting white control over the newly-
freed black population.42 In the years following the Civil War, 
slave codes gave way to “Black Codes,” which reinstated a dual 
system of criminal justice based explicitly on race, with the death 
penalty at its center.43 As was the case under slavery, blacks 
“were given harsher punishments than whites for committing 
similar offenses.”44 In Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina, 
for example, “only blacks could be executed for raping a white 
woman.”45  
Although Reconstruction ended de jure discrimination under 
the Black Codes, it did not—and, indeed, could not—end de facto 
discrimination.46 As Goldfarb notes, “[t]he past was not the past; 
it flourished in new forms.”47 Reconstruction’s failure to secure 
equal rights for black people has been well-documented, with 
numerous scholars detailing how proponents of racial segregation 
turned to the criminal justice system, generally—and the death 
penalty, specifically—as a tool of racial control.48 Racial 
discrimination, no longer explicit in the law, persisted in the 
administration of the death penalty under Jim Crow.49 
                                                                                                     
 41. See David Brion Davis, From Homicide to Slavery: Studies in American 
Culture 40 (1986) (“After the Civil War, men’s finer sensibilities, which had once 
been revolted by the execution of a fellow being, seemed hardened and 
blunted.”). 
 42. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1402; see also Steiker, supra note 6, at 19. 
 43. State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 208 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Loftin, 724 A.2d at 208 (“Despite the abolition of the Black Codes 
during Reconstruction, racial discrimination in the administration of criminal 
justice  remained.”); Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1402 (discussing selective 
enforcement of law enforcement policies during Jim Crow era). 
 47. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1403. 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 1402–03 (“[S]trictly enforced racial segregation policies 
and selectively enforced law enforcement policies . . . provid[ed] white majorities 
with the control they felt they needed”); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW 
JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); KHALIL 
GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2011). 
 49. See Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1402 (“When federal efforts to support 
192 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 184 (2017) 
In the late nineteenth century, southern states openly 
defended a racially discriminatory death penalty as necessary to 
deter white vigilantism, i.e., lynching.50 Black people suspected of 
crimes were going to be killed no matter what, the argument 
went. Better, then, to execute black people after trial than for 
white mobs to cut them down and parade their mutilated remains 
through the street. The Equal Justice Initiative has noted that 
when proponents of racial justice campaigned against lynchings 
during the 1920s and 1930s, communities turned to the death 
penalty instead.51 Campaigns against lynchings in the early 
twentieth century, therefore, ultimately helped to consolidate the 
use of capital punishment in America.  
In the mid-twentieth century, the progress of racial justice 
once again worked to the disadvantage of death penalty abolition. 
Between 1957 and 1965, five states abolished the death penalty—
Alaska, Hawaii, Vermont, West Virginia, and Iowa.52 But, as 
Goldfarb notes, the successes of the Civil Rights movement in the 
1960s and 1970s provide at least a partial explanation for the 
failure of the anti-death penalty movement to secure lasting, 
nationwide abolition before the U.S. Supreme Court.53 When the 
Court temporarily outlawed capital punishment in 1972 in 
Furman v. Georgia, it was perceived as yet another interference 
with “states’ rights”—the same argument advanced by the 
                                                                                                     
and protect former slaves during the Reconstruction era were brought to a 
premature halt, strictly enforced racial segregation policies and selectively 
enforced law enforcement policies--the era known as Jim Crow--emerged, 
providing white majorities with the control they felt they needed.”). 
 50. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 23 (“[O]ne of the primary considerations in 
favor of retention (and of reinstatement after abolition) of the death penalty was 
the need to maintain capital punishment to reduce incidence of mob violence.”). 
 51. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE 
LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR (2d ed. 2015), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/lynching-
in-america-second-edition-summary.pdf; see also James W. Clarke, Without Fear 
or Shame: Lynching, Capital Punishment and the Subculture of Violence in the 
American South, 28 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 268, 284–85 (1998). 
 52. Hugo Adam Bedau, Background and Developments, in THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA, CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 3, 9 (1997). 
 53. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1410–11 (“But for the resentment of civil 
rights progress that led to restoration of capital punishment, the death penalty 
would have been unavailable.”); see also EVAN MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE 
DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 264–280 (2013). 
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Confederate states in defense of slavery.54 This backlash 
culminated in the restoration of the death penalty four years 
later in Gregg v. Georgia,55 which purported to rid the death 
penalty of arbitrariness once and for all.56 
Not surprisingly, given the death penalty’s roots in slavery 
and its reinforcement of racial subordination after the Civil War, 
the task the Supreme Court set for itself in Gregg has proven 
impossible. The post-1972 death penalty systems, like their 
forbearers, remain rife with discrimination.57 As Carol and 
Jordan Steiker note, “the current map of active death penalty 
states is predominantly a map of the former Confederacy.”58 And 
as Goldfarb points out, nearly all executions occur in states “with 
the most extensive lynching histories.”59The sickening spectacle 
in Arkansas in April 2017 is a case in point.60 Arkansas, a former 
slaveholding state, seceded from the Union at the start of the 
Civil War in 1861.61 Between 1877 and 1950, 491 African 
Americans were lynched in Arkansas, just behind Mississippi 
(614), Georgia (595), and Louisiana (559).62 Further, Arkansas is 
home to Phillips County, the site of a staggering 244 lynchings—
                                                                                                     
 54. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).  During oral 
arguments in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Solicitor General—
Robert Bork—argued that “these cases are about democratic government, the 
right of various legislatures of the United States, to choose or reject—according 
to their own moral sense and that of the people, the death penalty, in 
accordance with the Constitution.”  EVAN MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH 
AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 386—387 (2013). 
 55. 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
 56. See id. (stating that concerns with arbitrariness could be “met by a 
system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding”). 
 57. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 66–68 (Conn. 2015); State v. 
Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 208 (N.J. 1999); see also STEIKER, supra note 6, at 110 
(“[T]he unjust influence of race in the capital punishment process continues 
unchecked.”); Bedau, supra note 52, at 459 (“The good-faith hopes of the Gregg 
majority in 1976 . . . have simply not been borne out in practice in the two 
decades since then.”). 
 58. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 17. 
 59. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1409. 
 60. See generally DeMillo, supra note 1, and accompanying text. 
 61. Ralph Wooster, The Arkansas Secession Convention, 13 ARK. HIST. Q. 
172 (1954). 
 62. EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA:  CONFRONTING THE 
LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR, SECOND EDITION 16, http://eji.org/sites/default/files/ 
lynching-in-america-second-edition-summary.pdf. 
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the most of any county in the U.S. and nearly five times the 
number of lynchings as second place Caddo, Louisiana, with 51.63  
The northern experience also sheds light on the death 
penalty’s connection to slavery. In the late 1700’s and early 
1800’s, for example, the northern states of Pennsylvania, New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
New York, and New Jersey took steps to restrict the use of capital 
punishment.64 In the years that followed, the death penalty faded 
in these states as the number of death-eligible crimes and 
executions declined, and as calls for abolition of the death penalty 
increased.65 Connecticut is a case in point. Over the course of its 
nearly 400-year-old experiment with the death penalty, a single 
theme characterized Connecticut’s relationship to the death 
penalty: the reluctance to impose it.66 Indeed, between 1960 and 
2012, when it repealed the death penalty, Connecticut executed 
only 2 people—both of whom volunteered for it.67  
In many non-slave-holding states admitted to the Union in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, the connection between 
slavery and the death penalty was even more direct. Michigan 
and Wisconsin, which were admitted as free states in 1837 and 
1848, respectively, abolished their death penalties less than a 
decade after admission.68 Maine, admitted in 1820, and 
                                                                                                     
 63. Id. at 17. 
 64. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 20–21; see generally David Brion Davis, The 
Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787-1861, 63 AM. HIST. 
REVIEW 23 (1957) (surveying the history of the abolition of the death penalty in 
several Northern states). 
 65. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 36 (Conn. 2015) (stating that 
“[s]ecularization, evolving moral standards, new constitutional and procedural 
protections, and the availability of incarceration as a viable alternative to 
execution have resulted in capital punishment being available for far fewer 
crimes and criminals, and being imposed far less frequently, with a concomitant 
deterioration in public acceptance” over Connecticut’s “nearly 400 year history”); 
STEIKER, supra note 18, at 20–21 (discussing “[t]he substantial narrowing of the 
ambit of the death penalty down to murder and treason . . . in the North by the 
time of the Civil War,” and discussing “legislative initiatives for wholesale 
abolition of capital punishment in the North . . . [f]rom the 1830s to the 1850s”). 
 66. See Santiago, 122 A.3d at 38 (“[C]onnecticut’s] whole state history 
demonstrates a reluctance to impose the death penalty.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Bedau, supra note 52, at 9. 
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Minnesota, admitted in 1858, took a bit longer; they abolished 
their death-penalties within seventy and sixty years of admission, 
respectively.69 While the northern states were no strangers to 
racism, their racism knew bounds.70 
From this brisk historical survey, a central theme emerges: 
where slavery was not firmly entrenched, the death penalty 
withered; where slavery flourished, the death penalty remained 
an integral part of the criminal justice system. As Carol and 
Jordan Steiker have noted, in the North, the death penalty 
abolition movement and the slavery abolition movement were 
“mutually reinforcing.”71 In the South, the linkage of the two 
movements “led them to fail together.”72  
Some have taken offense to the death penalty’s comparison to 
slavery. During a public hearing on the bill that repealed 
Connecticut’s death penalty in 2012, State Senator John Kissel, a 
Republican with six prisons and 8,000 inmates in his district, 
objected to testimony comparing the death penalty to slavery: 
[T]o analogize folks that support [the death penalty] to people 
that supported slavery, that’s so offensive. To analogize this to 
individuals that just act out of rage or vindictiveness, that’s 
just not right. . . . I take umbrage at the whole slavery thing 
because, once upon a time, one of my relatives was a surgeon 
in the union side of the Civil War. Come on, man, . . . to make 
that analogy, I think, is a stretch.73 
But the link between slavery and the death penalty is not a 
stretch, and the death penalty’s support among northerners does 
                                                                                                     
 69. Id. at 9. 
 70. Compare Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 
1286 (Mass. 1980) (“We reject any suggestion that racial discrimination is 
confined to the South or to any other geographical area.”), with Santiago, 122 
A.3d at 52 (noting that executions are “overwhelmingly confined to the South 
[and states bordering the South], the very same jurisdictions that were last to 
abandon slavery and segregation, and . . . were most resistant to the federal 
enforcement of civil rights norms”); see also Loftin, 724 A.2d at 206 (Handler, J., 
dissenting) (discussing racism, slavery, and the death penalty); NAACP Amic. 
Br., supra note 20, at *8-13 (same). 
 71. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 22. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Hrg. on Raised Bill No. 280, An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital 
Felonies, Before the Connecticut General Assembly, Joint Committee on 
Judiciary, March 14, 2012 (statement of Sen. John Kissel) 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/juddata/chr/2012JUD00314-R001100-CHR.htm.  
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not make it so. While it is true that people in Connecticut have 
supported the death penalty throughout history, they—unlike 
their brethren to the south—have been reluctant to use it.74 And 
one of the primary reasons that Connecticut has lacked an 
appetite for execution is because it does not share the South’s 
long history of slavery and its tolerance for state-sponsored 
violence to sustain racial control.75 
III. The Silent Branch 
In Dred Scott v. Sanford, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly 
sanctioned slavery, articulating a powerful defense of racial 
subordination that set the stage for the Civil War.76 Although the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly defended racial subordination 
in the death penalty context, it certainly has not challenged it. In 
Justice Accused, Robert Cover examines how the judiciary 
responded to the moral and legal dilemmas posed by slavery, and 
notes how even anti-slavery judges were ultimately complicit in 
the survival of slavery.77 His analysis can be applied to today’s 
judiciary, particularly the ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
has failed to acknowledge the pervasive influence of slavery on 
the administration of capital punishment.  
A majority of the Supreme Court has never addressed the 
death penalty’s historical roots in slavery. Take Furman, for 
example, in which a majority of the Court imposed a moratorium 
on the death penalty out of concern for arbitrariness.78 Despite 
the centrality of race to the issue of arbitrariness, only Justices 
Douglas and Marshall squarely addressed racial discrimination 
                                                                                                     
 74. See generally supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing 
Connecticut’s reluctance to impose death penalty). 
 75. See generally supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing 
relationship between slavery and death penalty). 
 76. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857) (“[N]either the class 
of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether 
they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, 
nor intended to be included in the general words used in [the Declaration of 
Independence].”). 
 77. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1984). 
 78. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). 
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in their concurring opinions.79 Neither of them mentioned 
slavery.80 Some commentators argue that the majority’s decision 
to ignore race enabled, or even encouraged, states to recalibrate 
their death penalty statutes.81 
McCleskey v Kemp, decided in 1987, is often considered to be 
the Court’s seminal decision on the relevance of race to questions 
of the death penalty’s constitutionality.82 In that case, the Court 
infamously held that statistical evidence of racial disparities in 
the application of capital punishment are to be tolerated, and 
that a person’s death sentence will only be quashed on such 
grounds if it can be shown that a decision-maker in his or her 
particular case acted with specific discriminatory intent.83 Not 
surprisingly, the majority made no mention of the death penalty’s 
roots in slavery. Only Justice Brennan, writing for the four 
dissenters, drew parallels between the modern death penalty and 
the race-conscious criminal justice systems that reinforced 
slavery.84 “[W]e cannot pretend that in three decades we have 
completely escaped the grip of a historical legacy spanning 
centuries,” he wrote.85 “[W]e remain imprisoned by the past as 
long as we deny its influence on the present.”86 
The decision in McCleskey has been described by Anthony 
Amsterdam, who led the death penalty abolitionist efforts of the 
1960s and 1970s, as “the Dred Scott of our time.”87 Michelle 
Alexander has likewise written that “McCleskey v. Kemp and its 
progeny serve much the same function as Dred Scott and 
                                                                                                     
 79. Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that standardless death 
penalty statutes were “pregnant with discrimination”); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (“It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more 
often than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population.”). 
 80. See generally id. 
 81. See MANDERY, supra note 54, at 277–278 (noting that “those aggrieved 
by the Court’s race decisions sublimated their anger into the effort to revive 
capital punishment”). 
 82. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 83. Id. at 297–99, 312–13. 
 84. Id. at 328–33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 344. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Adam Liptak, New Look at Death Sentences and Race, NY TIMES (April 
29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/us/29bar.html (last visited May 
30, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
198 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 184 (2017) 
Plessy”—preserving racial caste systems.88 In Dred Scott, Chief 
Justice Taney infamously declared that slaves were sub-human 
for the purposes of the American legal system: “It is too clear for 
dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be 
included, and formed no part of the people who framed and 
adopted [the Declaration of Independence].”89 In Taney’s view, 
black people were “so far inferior, that they had no rights which 
the white man was bound to respect . . . [Africans] were brought 
and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and 
traffic, whenever a profit could be made of it.”90 As McCleskey’s 
many critics rightly argue, capital punishment, like slavery, is 
premised on the belief that some people are not worthy of 
membership in the human family.91 
Besides Justice Brennan, no other Supreme Court Justice 
has attempted to place the death penalty in its historical, slavery-
rooted context. Instead, the focus has been on the notoriously 
difficult-to-prove animus and stereotypes of individual actors in 
the death penalty system—not on the system itself. In recent 
years, for example, the Court has struck down several death 
sentences in which inmates have demonstrated that prosecutors 
or jurors based their decision to seek or impose a death sentence 
on the grounds of race. However, in none of these cases have the 
Justices expressly acknowledged the legacy of slavery.  
In Buck v. Davis,92 decided earlier this year, the Court 
accepted that Duane Buck had been unconstitutionally sentenced 
to death because a psychologist had testified that, as a black 
man, Buck was particularly prone to violence.93 But Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for a 6-2 majority, failed to note that this 
                                                                                                     
 88. ALEXANDER, supra note 48, at 194. 
 89. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Enhanced willingness to impose the death sentence on black defendants, or 
diminished willingness to render such a sentence when blacks are victims, 
reflects a devaluation of the lives of black persons.”). 
 92. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).  
 93. See id. at 776 (holding that defense attorney’s introduction of 
psychologist’s testimony that “one of the factors pertinent in assessing a 
person’s propensity for violence was his race, and that Buck was statistically 
more likely to act violently because he is black” constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
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stereotype—that a black man is biologically prone to 
“dangerousness”—derives from the so-called scientific studies 
that were used to justify slavery.94 Similarly, in Foster v. 
Chatman,95 decided in 2016, the Court ruled in favor of 
petitioner, and chastised the prosecutor who had deliberately 
struck black people off the jury with the intent to empanel an all-
white jury.96 As Goldfarb notes in her article, the phenomenon of 
all-white juries being empaneled against black defendants so as 
to ensure a conviction finds it roots in slavery and in post-
emancipation attempts to subjugate black people.97 Yet the Court 
in Foster v. Chatman again refrained from mentioning slavery.98  
Taking their lead from the Supreme Court, the lower federal 
courts and nearly all state courts have remained silent on the 
death penalty’s connection to slavery. For example, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently overturned Johnny Bennett’s 
death sentence on the grounds that the prosecutor in his case had 
used racially inflammatory language during the trial.99 
Prosecutor Donald Myers had referred to Bennett—an African 
American—variously as “King Kong,” a “caveman,” a “mountain 
man,” a “monster,” a “big old tiger,” and “[t]he beast of burden.”100 
Although the Court found in Bennett’s favor, it made only oblique 
reference to “historical prejudice against African Americans, who 
have been appallingly disparaged as primates or members of a 
subhuman species in some lesser state of evolution.”101 
The reluctance of courts to explicitly use the word “slavery,” 
or to squarely confront the ways in which the legacy of slavery is 
woven into the fabric of capital punishment, can mean only one of 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 776 (characterizing the psychologist’s testimony as “a particularly 
noxious strain of racial prejudice” without reference to its roots in slavery). 
 95. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).   
 96. See id. at 1755 (holding that “prosecutors were motivated in substantial 
part by race when they struck [two black prospective jurors]”). 
 97. See Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1414–15 (discussing jury eligibility laws 
and jury selection practices that combine to exclude African-Americans from the 
jury box). 
 98.  See generally Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737. 
 99. See Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 324-25 (2016) (holding that 
prosecutor’s argument, which depicted Bennett “as less human on account of his 
race,” exceeded “all permissible bounds” in violation of due process). 
 100. Id. at 321. 
 101. Id. at 324–25. 
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three things. First, there simply is no connection between slavery 
and the modern death penalty: the past is in the past, thanks to 
procedural safeguards imposed by the Supreme Court. Second, 
there is a connection, but courts are not troubled by it. Or third, 
there is a troubling connection, but there is nothing courts can do 
about it.  
The first conclusion is untenable. The Court in Gregg did not 
sever the death penalty’s ties to slavery and racial 
subordination,102 and the regional differences in the application of 
the death penalty are not coincidental. As Goldfarb ably 
demonstrates, racial animus and stereotypes are not issues that 
affect some cases but not others.103 The entire death penalty 
system is steeped in the values and beliefs that underpinned 
slavery; the notion that some people do not belong to the moral 
and political human community and can be treated and discarded 
as mere objects instead.104  
The second conclusion is unthinkable. The Court, as a 
chronicler of history, has an obligation to expose the death 
penalty’s roots in slavery.105 By remaining silent, the Court 
legitimizes a racial legacy that continues to drive the death 
penalty today. 
The third conclusion is unacceptable. There is much the 
Court can do and little to prevent it from doing so. We turn now 
to the ways in which several state supreme court justices have 
addressed the death penalty’s connections to slavery, and how 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. at 2760 (2015) (“Despite the Gregg 
Court’s hope for fair administration of the death penalty, 40 years of further 
experience make it increasingly clear that the death penalty is imposed 
arbitrarily, i.e., without the ‘reasonable consistency’ legally necessary to 
reconcile its use with the Constitution's commands.”) (quoting Gregg). 
 103. See Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1408 (“To one degree or another, every 
criminal case has been shaped by race. Our criminal justice system was forged 
in America's racial cauldron and would not look as it does but for our racial 
history.”). 
 104. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272–73 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“The true significance of . . . punishments [condemned by history] is 
that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be 
toyed with and discarded.”). 
 105. See STEIKER, supra note 6, at 111 (“[T]he Court’s failure to address 
forthrightly the death penalty’s racialized history and current practice has 
disserved the Court in its role as chronicler of history and social and political 
practices.”). 
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and why the Supreme Court and state and federal lower courts 
should do the same. 
IV. Looking Back, a Way Forward 
The Supreme Court’s failure to address the death penalty’s 
connection to slavery serves only to deepen the connection. As 
Chief Justice Roberts noted in another context, “[T]o blind 
yourself to history is both prideful and unwise. ‘The past is never 
dead. It’s not even past.’”106  
Despite the Supreme Court’s silence, several state courts 
have risen to the occasion, expressing concern over the death 
penalty’s ties to racism generally, and to slavery in particular. In 
1980, in District Attorney v. Watson, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the death penalty violated the state 
constitution based in part on evidence of racial discrimination in 
the administration of the death penalty throughout the southern 
states.107 According to the court, “[t]he conclusion is inescapable 
that the death penalty is reserved for those who kill whites, 
because the criminal justice system in these states simply does 
not put the same value on the life of a black person as it does on 
the life of a white.”108 The race of the defendant also mattered, 
with “a disproportionate number of nonwhite offenders being 
sentenced to death.”109 To the Massachusetts high court, this 
discounting of black lives, a practice rooted in slavery, was fatal 
to the death penalty. 
In 1999, in State v. Loftin, Justice Handler of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court similarly argued in dissent that New Jersey’s 
death penalty statute was unconstitutional because of “a long and 
relentless history of racism that has not only the capacity to 
                                                                                                     
 106. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (quoting William Faulkner, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951)). 
 107. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Cty. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1285–86 (Mass. 
1980), superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST. art. CXVI, and 
by statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 2 (2008); see also State v. Dicks, 615 
S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tenn. 1981) (finding “irrefutable” the Watson Court’s 
conclusion that “the death penalty is administered with unconstitutional 
arbitrariness and discrimination”). 
 108. Id. at 1286. 
 109. Id. 
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cause a disproportionate impact on blacks in the administration 
of the death penalty, but has indeed done so from the era of 
slavery in this country, and, many argue, to the present.”110  
And in 2015, in State v. Santiago, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional based, in part, 
on its finding that the death penalty “appears to be inescapably 
tainted by caprice and bias,” particularly, “racial and ethnic 
discrimination.”111 Significantly, statistical evidence of such 
discrimination was not before the court, nor were alleged 
instances of racial bias by individual prosecutors, jurors, and 
judges.112 Instead, the court assumed that there existed a risk of 
racial and ethnic discrimination in capital sentencing, and 
concluded that such risk deprived the death penalty of any 
legitimate penological purpose.113 The court also pointed to the 
“striking” disparity in death penalty usage between the northern 
states and “the thirteen states that comprised the Confederacy,” 
                                                                                                     
 110. State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 206 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 207–08 (discussing historical relationship between slavery and the 
death penalty).  
 111. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 66–68 (Conn. 2015); see also id. at 36 
(“[T]hroughout every period of our state’s history, the death penalty has been 
imposed disproportionately on those whom society has marginalized socially, 
politically, and economically: people of color, the poor and uneducated, and 
unpopular immigrant and ethnic groups. It always has been easier for us to 
execute those we see as inferior or less intrinsically worthy.”). 
 112. Compare id. at 85 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring) (“[W]e cannot 
end our state's nearly 400 year struggle with the macabre muck of capital 
punishment litigation without speaking to the persistent allegations of racial 
and ethnic discrimination that have permeated the breadth of this state's 
experience with capital charging and sentencing decisions. We recognize that 
this particular challenge to [racial and ethnic discrimination in] our state's 
capital punishment regime has not been raised or briefed in the present case 
and, therefore, cannot serve as the basis for the majority’s holding today.”), with 
id. at 67 n. 104 “Justices Norcott and McDonald refer to what now appears to be 
strong evidence demonstrating that impermissible racial and ethnic disparities 
have, in fact, permeated this state's capital sentencing scheme. We decline to 
address or resolve such claims, however, because they are not before us at this 
time.”). 
 113. See id. at 66–68 (concluding that “individualized sentencing necessarily 
opens the door to racial and ethnic discrimination in capital sentencing,” and 
that it is not “possible to eliminate arbitrary and discriminatory application of 
capital punishment through a more precise and restrictive definition of capital 
crimes if prosecutors always remain free not to seek the death penalty for a 
particular defendant, and juries not to impose it, for any reason whatsoever”) 
(emphasis in original). 
THE DEATH PENALTY’S DARK SIDE 203 
noting that the latter “were last to abandon slavery and 
segregation, and . . . were most resistant to the federal 
enforcement of civil rights norms.”114  
Calling the majority’s commentary on race “extraordinary 
and inflammatory,” the Santiago dissenters shot back: 
[T]he majority suggests that Southerners are racists, and so 
are those who support the death penalty. Painting 
Southerners and supporters of the death penalty with the 
broad brush of racism could appear to some to be racist itself 
and reinforces stereotypes that have no foundation in fact or 
law.115 
In a concurring opinion, Justices Fleming Norcott and 
Andrew McDonald traced the “unmistakable racial dimension” of 
Connecticut’s death penalty, including the fact that “in almost 
400 years, no white person has ever been executed in Connecticut 
for the murder of a black person.”116 Like the majority, the 
concurring justices emphasized the impermissible risk that “the 
death penalty in Connecticut, as elsewhere, has been and 
continues to be imposed disproportionately on racial and ethnic 
minorities, and particularly on those whose victims are members 
of the white majority.”117 Responding to the dissenters’ 
McCleskey-based argument that there was no evidence of 
individual racial animus, the concurring justices discussed the 
                                                                                                     
 114. Id. at 52; see also NAACP Amic. Br., supra note 20, at *8 (“[T]he large 
proportion of nonwhites who were executed is merely the present phenomenon 
of racial discrimination being exercised against the nonwhite. Slavery was 
exclusively a Southern phenomenon, lynching was primarily a Southern 
phenomenon, and the general data with respect to all crimes, and particularly 
the crime of rape, indicates that the South has been the prime contributor to the 
disproportionate application of the death penalty to blacks.”). 
 115. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 394–95 (Conn. 2015) (Espinosa, J., 
dissenting); see also id. at 137 n.1 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting) (“Because the 
majority points to no evidence that the citizens of this state support slavery or 
resist civil rights, I can only conclude that the majority has cited these sources 
as part of its general strategy of creating an aura of disrespectability around the 
death penalty that is in no manner derived from the contemporary moral values 
of this state's legislature or its citizens.”). 
 116. Id. at 87 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring).  
 117. Id. at 96 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring); see also id. at 95 (“A 
thorough and fair-minded review of the available historical and sociological data 
thus strongly suggests that systemic racial bias continues to infect the capital 
punishment system in Connecticut in the post-Furman era.”) (Norcott & 
McDonald, JJ., concurring). 
204 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 184 (2017) 
death penalty’s deeper roots in subordination by the cultural 
majority that, regrettably but inevitably, carries through to the 
present day: 
We strongly emphasize that the fact that a charging or 
sentencing decision may be based in part on impermissible 
racial factors does not imply that the prosecutor, judge, or 
juror making that decision is “racist,” as that term is typically 
used. Statistical studies from other jurisdictions have 
demonstrated that the most likely explanation for such 
disparities is the tendency of members of the majority race to 
be more empathetic to majority victims, who resemble 
themselves, and less sympathetic to minority perpetrators, 
with whom they are less able to identify. This conclusion is 
bolstered by recent scientific studies that now document what 
has long been recognized: most, if not all, of us exhibit 
unconscious or implicit bias. 
It likely is the case that many, if not most, of the documented 
disparities in capital charging and sentencing arise not from 
purposeful, hateful racism or racial animus, but rather from 
these sorts of subtle, imperceptible biases on the part of 
generally well-meaning decision makers. Historically, though, 
it is difficult to refute . . . that, at varying times throughout 
our history, the lives of Native Americans, African Americans, 
Asians, Irish, Italians, Jews, Roman Catholics, and Hispanics 
simply have not been considered to be as innately valuable as 
those of the cultural majority.118 
Together, these decisions suggest two doctrinal pathways for 
the courts’ consideration of the death penalty’s roots in slavery, 
which neatly align with the Supreme Court’s two-part 
proportionality test under the Eighth Amendment.119 
First, in determining whether there exists objective evidence 
of a “national consensus” in support of the death penalty, courts 
should consider not only the dwindling number of southern states 
that retain and impose the death penalty, but also those states’ 
historical commitment to slavery.120 A penalty rooted in slavery, 
                                                                                                     
 118. Id. at 95–96 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring); see also McCleskey 
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 332 (1987) (“[A]mericans share a historical experience 
that has resulted in individuals within the culture ubiquitously attaching a 
significance to race that is irrational and often outside their awareness.”). 
 119. See Kevin Barry, The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. 
REV. 383, 418 (2017) (discussing the Court’s two-prong proportionality inquiry). 
 120. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 52 (Conn. 2015) (“The 
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which retains robust support among only a small number of 
states with a deeply troubling legacy of slavery, is a penalty that 
has lost the support of the Nation.121 
Second, in determining whether the death penalty furthers 
the deterrent and retributive goals of punishment, courts should 
acknowledge a state’s legacy of slavery and the death penalty’s 
historical roots in slavery, and should consider whether this 
linkage creates a substantial risk that race continues to play a 
role in the selection of people for death.122 A penalty that risks 
deterring primarily black offenders and those who murder 
whites, and that risks targeting black people for “just desserts” 
and expressing outrage for white but not black victims, does not 
further the legitimate purposes of deterrence and retribution. It 
furthers racial subordination—an impermissible purpose if ever 
there was one.123 
Clearly, courts troubled by the death penalty’s connection to 
slavery can address this connection in their jurisprudence. But 
there are many reasons why courts may not want to do so, 
including: concern with alienating southern states by depicting 
them as “racist”; the McCleskey majority’s concern with opening 
the floodgates to arguments over the role of racism and the legacy 
of slavery in non-capital cases;124 and an abiding faith that race 
                                                                                                     
geographic concentration of . . . executions [carried out nationwide since 1976] is 
remarkable. The thirteen states that comprised the Confederacy have carried 
out more than 75 percent of the nation’s executions over the past four decades.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 96 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he death 
penalty in Connecticut, as elsewhere, has been and continues to be imposed 
disproportionately on racial and ethnic minorities, and particularly on those 
whose victims are members of the white majority.”); id. at 66 (“[T]he selection of 
which offenders live and which offenders die appears to be inescapably tainted 
by caprice and bias.”). 
 123. See Barry, supra note 119, at 424 n.278 (discussing illegitimacy of 
racially discriminatory death penalty); cf. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 90–91, 110 
(discussing NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s argument in Furman that “the death 
penalty remained on the books in large part because of its racially 
discriminatory administration”) (emphasis added); NAACP Amic. Br., supra 
note 20, at *21 (“Racism, from which many receive concrete economic benefits 
and psychic sustenance, subsides with great resistance—especially given the 
current attempts by irresponsible politicians to revive fears in the white 
populace of the ‘black rebel’ with the code words of ‘Law and Order.’”). 
 124. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314–15 (1987) (“McCleskey's 
claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles 
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can be removed from the equation of death in the future without 
wading into an ugly past. None of these reasons is persuasive. 
The alienation of southern states is a legitimate concern but 
should not guide the courts in deciding to address slavery. Not all 
southerners lost the Civil War; for many of the descendants of 
enslaved people and whites whose homes dotted the Underground 
Railroad, their South won. Similarly, not all southerners support 
the death penalty. A decision acknowledging the death penalty’s 
ties to slavery does not disparage a monolithic South; rather, it 
pays tribute to southern voices that have not been heard.125 
Acknowledging these ties, moreover, does not require calling 
anyone a “racist.” As Connecticut Supreme Court Justices 
Norcott and McDonald stated, “[t]he types of subtle biases that 
influence members of the majority to make decisions favoring 
their own race may well be inevitable, albeit regrettable. When 
unconsciously made, they do not inherently impugn the diligent 
and good faith work of our prosecutors, police, judges, and 
jurors.”126 
Fear of opening the floodgates to non-capital challenges 
based on the legacy of slavery is also overblown. As the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, “[o]ur society’s 
failure to bring evenhandedness to the entire spectrum of 
criminal punishment calls for great and persistent effort toward 
improvement. However, we are not required to abandon all such 
punishments on constitutional grounds.”127 Stated another way, 
“[t]he death penalty is fundamentally different from other 
punishments for which we may, reluctantly, have to tolerate 
                                                                                                     
that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”); Steiker, supra note 6, at 98–
109 (discussing various reasons for Supreme Court’s “deafening silence on the 
subject of race in its foundational capital punishment cases”). 
 125. Cf. Ben Jones, The Republican Party, Conservatives, and the Future of 
Capital Punishment, J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming) (discussing 
increasing number of conservatives who have turned against the death penalty 
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some degree of unintentional systemic disparity or 
imperfection.”128 
Lastly, faith in a color-blind death penalty is deeply 
misguided. For over forty years, courts have tried and failed to 
eliminate race from the death penalty calculus.129 The taint of 
bias and caprice, rooted in slavery, simply cannot be removed. 
V. The Future of Abolition 
It has been over 40 years since Gregg revivified a dying death 
penalty.130 For over a decade, Justice Kennedy has applied his 
characteristic logic of the heart to the Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence, setting the table for a per se challenge that would 
put the death penalty to rest forever.131 At the time of this 
writing, it now appears that he is prepared to step away from 
that table.132 The settings will be cleared, and the death penalty 
will likely remain with us for some time—a crude tool to be used 
by politicians to rally their base, to reinvigorate their campaigns, 
to make America “great.”133 Power, not principle, will continue to 
define the death penalty. 
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We remind Justice Kennedy that he can stop this carnival of 
cruelty, this macabre charade. History has given him an ability 
that few can claim: He can prevent death.134 Should he retire 
without declaring the death penalty unconstitutional, we shall 
forever number the losses spurred by his inaction. What a waste 
of lives and legacy. Rather than the Justice who brought long-
awaited coherence to the Eighth Amendment’s dignity doctrine,135 
Justice Kennedy will become just another retired Justice who 
wished he had.136 
Eventually, though, the Supreme Court will abolish the 
death penalty, bringing the U.S. in line with 141 other 
abolitionist countries throughout the world.137 When the Court 
abolishes, it will almost certainly base its decision on the death 
penalty’s inherently flawed administration—the unreliability, 
arbitrary imposition, and protracted delay that deprives the 
death penalty of any legitimate purpose.138 The Court might also 
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find that the death penalty is at odds with human dignity; it is 
the ultimate humiliation.139 Such reasoning will be much 
welcomed among abolitionists, but an opportunity will have been 
missed. As a chronicler of history, the Court should take the 
opportunity to shine the light on the role that slavery has played 
in perpetuating the legitimacy of the death penalty since colonial 
times.140 This will ensure an accurate picture of one of our 
country’s most racist institutions. More importantly, it will 
ensure that the death penalty, like slavery, never returns. 
In the meantime, the abolition movement will continue, with 
government, businesses, and private citizens all playing a role.141 
Judges, legislators, and governors will continue to halt the death 
penalty through judicial abolition, statutory repeal, moratoria, 
and clemency. Prosecutors will refuse to seek the death penalty 
and defenders will slow its progress through legal challenges to 
the death penalty per se and as applied. Police chiefs and prison 
wardens will highlight the death penalty’s exorbitant costs and 
secondary trauma, while international leaders mobilize the 
shame of the world community. Media, researchers, and 
academics will focus national and international attention on the 
intractable issues of innocence, botched executions, arbitrariness 
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and racial discrimination, undue delay, disability, poverty, and 
inadequate representation. Medical professionals and drug 
manufacturers will decry lethal injection’s perversion of medical 
ethics. Civil rights organizations, faith groups, and family 
members of murder victims will hold vigils, disrupt the flow of 
lethal injection drugs, and organize grassroots campaigns to 
reform and eventually end the death penalty. 
Like the movement to abolish slavery, death penalty 
abolition will eventually achieve its end and, in time, will be 
widely regarded as right. Indeed, Harriett Tubman, who once had 
a price on her head for disrupting the flow of free black labor in 
the antebellum south, will soon grace the front of the $20 bill 
(although Donald Trump has suggested that slaveholder Andrew 
Jackson ought to remain there); the D.C. home of former slave 
turned abolitionist statesman, author, and activist Frederick 
Douglass is a national historic site; and John Brown, who was 
hanged for attempting to overthrow the slave system through 
armed conflict, assumed the status of icon “in the eyes of African 
Americans, abolitionists, and revolutionaries all over the 
world.”142 
In anticipation of the death penalty’s inevitable abolition, we 
close with the following words of gratitude. 
To the growing number of young people in the U.S. who see 
the death penalty as an anachronism that divides rather than 
unites our increasingly diverse society, we look forward to the 
contribution you will make. Indeed, we have already seen it. The 
#BlackLivesMatter movement—founded in 2012 in response to 
widely publicized incidents of black people being shot by police 
officers—has included death penalty abolition among its core 
aims, calling out the death penalty for “devalu[ing] Black lives” 
and “target[ing] Blacks and other people of color and poor people 
throughout . . . history.”143 Although more men of color are 
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incarcerated and shot by police than are executed each year, the 
death penalty is of critical importance for one simple reason: If 
the State can execute people of color, it can do anything to people 
of color. The death penalty is, quite literally, low-hanging fruit—
and strange fruit, indeed. Be indignant in your advocacy; you 
deserve better from your country. 
To those like Phyllis Goldfarb who have stood against the 
death penalty for so long, we thank you for shining the light that 
we follow. We are students of your advocacy—one of us, quite 
literally. As you say, the reality that race permeates the 
American death penalty “represents not only a profound concern 
about inequality and unfairness in the selection of defendants for 
death,” but also “an indictment of American systems of capital 
punishment.”144 We look forward to the day when the Supreme 
Court agrees. In solidarity, and one day in victory, we salute you. 
VI. Conclusion 
When the history of the death penalty is written, the death 
penalty’s connection to slavery will not be a distant parallel but a 
straight line. Phyllis Goldfarb’s article, Matters of Strata: Race, 
Gender, and Class Structures in Capital Cases traces that line.145 
The institution of slavery helps to explains why, over the past 
four decades, the thirteen states that comprised the former 
Confederacy have been responsible for nearly all of this nation’s 
executions.146 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to 
address this connection, several state court judges have risen to 
the occasion, calling out the impermissible taint of bias that 
colors the death penalty. More courts, including the Supreme 
Court, should follow their lead. In the meantime, we, like our 
abolitionist forebears, will fight. Emancipation was once 
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considered “a wild delusive idea,” but it became a reality.147 So, 
too, will abolition of the death penalty. 
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